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Amek bin-Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 335 N.W.2d 384 (1983)

People who cannot afford lawyers often try to represent themselves in court. Their pleadings are difficult to decipher and do not follow the law. In ordinary civil cases, courts look at the allegations of the pleading, not the label, and liberally construe it to determine whether it states a claim for relief. In this case, Abrahamson held that the same rule applies to prisoners who file court pleadings without the assistance of a lawyer.

State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 2015 WI 85, 363 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N. W.2d 165

Wisconsin’s campaign finance law prohibits candidates for elective office from coordinating spending by outside groups on “issue advocacy.” “Issue ads” do not expressly ask the public to vote for or against a candidate, but they often attack a candidate’s opponent. In this case, the majority held Wisconsin’s law unconstitutional because the First Amendment and the Wisconsin Constitution only permit states to regulate “express advocacy.” Abrahamson dissented, arguing that by adopting a faulty interpretation of the Wisconsin law and the First Amendment, the majority subjected the democratic process to potential corrupting influences. Two years later, the United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed a lower court decision holding that under the First Amendment states may indeed regulate issue advocacy. Independence Institute v. Federal Election Commission, 216 F. Supp.3d 176 (2016), aff’d 137 S. Ct. 1204 (2017).

League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Education Network v. Walker, 2014 WI 97, 357 Wis. 2d 360, 851 N.W.2d 302

In general, Wisconsin may require voters to verify their identity before casting a ballot. But Act 23 imposed a new restriction: people who meet the constitutional requirements to vote may be stripped of that right if they fail to produce a specific type of government-issued ID. The majority held Act 23 constitutional. Abrahamson dissented, arguing that Act 23 is unconstitutional. She said the majority was following “not James Madison—for whom Wisconsin’s capital city is named—but rather Jim Crow—the name typically used to refer to repressive laws used to restrict rights, including the right to vote, of African-Americans.”

Ranes v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 219 Wis. 2d 49, 580 N.W.2d 197 (1998)

An insured person injured in a car accident settled with the tortfeasor and then sued his insurer for underinsured motorist benefits. The insurer claimed that the lack of notice precluded it from seeking subrogation from the tortfeasor. Writing for a unanimous court, Abrahamson brought Wisconsin law in line with that of other states. She held that an insured’s failure to give notice to his insurer that he entered a settlement with the tortfeasor creates a rebuttable presumption that the insurer was prejudiced by the lack of notice. The insured must prove that the insurer was not prejudiced.

Hedtcke v. Sentry Insurance Co., 109 Wis. 2d 461, 326 N.W.2d 727 (1982)

A husband and wife jointly owned their home and were both named insureds on a fire insurance policy. When the wife sued for divorce and the circuit court ordered the husband to vacate their home, he burned it down. The insurance company refused to pay because the husband, one of the insureds, had cause the property damage. Writing for a unanimous court, Abrahamson overruled case law favoring the insurance company and held that an innocent insured under a fire insurance policy is not barred from recovering under the policy merely because another insured intentionally damaged the insured property.

Seifert v. Balink, 2017 WI 2, 372 Wis. 2d 525, 888 N.W.2d 816

In 2011, the Wisconsin legislature adopted the federal “Daubert standard” that circuit courts must apply when deciding whether to admit an expert’s opinion into evidence. In this case, the Court’s first opportunity to interpret the standard, the justices issued 4 separate opinions. Abrahamson’s opinion established the history, purpose, and methodology of the Daubert standard. She held that an expert physician’s testimony about the standard of care for a family-practice doctor doing obstetrics satisfied Daubert though it was based solely on his own experience. Only the dissenting opinion disagreed with her analysis.

Brantner v. Jenson, 121 Wis. 2d 658, 360 N.W.2d 529 (1985)

Due to a car accident, the plaintiff suffered a back injury and was told he might need surgery. After consulting a surgeon and speaking to his father who had the same surgery, the plaintiff became fearful about the pain and recovery time associated with the procedure. In a unanimous opinion, Abrahamson held that evidence of the plaintiff’s fear of possible future surgery was admissible and could be considered by the jury when determining damages for mental distress from the injury he sustained in the accident.

Sheboygan County v. Neal J.G., 2003 WI 11, 259 Wis. 2d 563, 657 N.W.2d 363

When the State seeks to terminate a person’s parental rights to an Indian child, it must comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act, a federal law aimed at promoting the stability of Indian tribes and families. In this case, the majority held that the state court did not have reason to know that the children involved might be Indian. Abrahamson dissented and argued that a father’s assertion that his children had Indian heritage, even if he could not identify the tribe, was sufficient to trigger the federal law.

Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 2003 WI 118, 265 Wis. 2d 64, 655 N.W.2d 899

Sometimes an Indian tribal court and a state court have concurrent jurisdiction over a civil dispute. Ultimately, one court must yield to the other—but how do they decide? Abrahamson, writing for the majority, reinforced an earlier ruling that when tribal and state courts realize that they have concurrent jurisdiction over a dispute they should apply principles of comity to determine which court should proceed. Then she listed 13 comity principles and explained how their application fosters tribal self-government and collaboration between tribal and state courts.

Tribal Sovereignty